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HARRY WELLER HILL*
The services of real estate brokers have come to include the drawing of contracts,
conveyances and other instruments essential to the closing of the transactions which
they have negotiated. Exception to the performance of this service by persons not
authorized to practice law has been taken by the legal profession in a series of cases,
most of which are of recent date.
In defense of their practice, the real estate brokers have relied on the following
contentions: (i) the drawing of legal instruments does not constitute the practice of
law. (2) Even if the drawing of "complex instruments" may be the practice of law,
this is not true of the drawing of "simple instruments." (3) Although the drawing
of instruments solely for others may constitute the practice of law, the broker is
entitled to draw instruments incidental to his business, or (4) for which he receives
no compensation. (5) Where the broker is licensed by the state and his license is
conditioned on a showing of knowledge of the principles of conveyancing law, he is
entitled to draw real estate instruments. All these propositions, of course, do not
appear in any single case, although two or more have been advanced in some cases.
However, for the purpose of this note, the treatment accorded by the courts to each
of these contentions will be considered separately.
(i) The first contention, that the drawing of legal instruments does not consti-
tute the practice of law, finds little support in the cases. Although one case has held
that the preparing and drawing of conveyances for others is not the practice of law'
(which has since been overruled) 2 and one court has intimated that if legal advice
were not given with the drawing of the instrument it might not be the practice of
law,3 the decisions overwhelmingly have held that the practice of law includes the
preparation and drawing of legal instruments, such as warranty deeds, quitclaim
deeds, mortgages, leases, building contracts, etc. 4 Some statutes which attempt to
* University of Alabama, 1932-33, Marshall College, 1933-1935. Now a member of the third year class,
Duke University School of Law. Member of the Editorial Board of the Duke Bar Association Journal.
'Atlanta Title & Trust Co. v. Boykin, 172 Ga. 437, 157 S. E. 455 (931); see dissent of Putnam, J., in
People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., i8o App. Div. 648, 655, 168 N. Y. Supp. 278, 284, 285 (1917);
dissent of McLaughlin, J., in People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 343, 344, 125 N. E. 671, 674, 675 (1919).
'Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932).
'In re McCallum, x86 Wash. 312, 314, 57 P. (2d) 1259, 126o (936). However, the same court
seems to assume that the drawing of instruments is the practice of law in In re Estes, 186 Wash. 69o, 57
P. (2d) 1262 (1936).
' People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. o89
(1926); Yeats v. Cunningham (Circ. Ct., Fla. 1936), BRAND, UNAUTHORIZED PRaCTCE DE cIsIONs (1937)
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define the practice of law specifically include the drawing of any paper relating to
secular rights. In Opinion of the Justices, the Massachusetts court said, "Practice of
law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the prep-
aration and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and
trust relations and other affairs."6
Since conveyances and like instruments are in their very nature designed to trans-
fer or at least affect certain rights and powers of individuals, then it is said that it is
as important in the public interest that the drawing of such papers be done only by
trained, licensed attorneys as that court work be handled only by them.7 In the New
York case of People v. Alfani, Crane, J., writing the opinion of the court, said, "Any
judge of much active work on the bench has had frequent occasion to guide the
young practitioner, or protect the client from the haste or folly of an older one. Not
so in the office. Here the client is with his attorney alone, without the impartial
supervision of a judge. Ignorance and stupidity may here create damage which the
courts of the land cannot thereafter undo. Did the legislature mean to leave this field
to any person out of which to make a living? Reason says no."
(2) The contention which would except "simple instruments" from the operation
of the rules established by the preceding cases has more judicial support. Some courts
have made a distinction between the drawing of skeleton blank or stereotyped forms,
such as a simple deed or mortgage not involving "special facts or conditions," and an
instrument which must be shaped from a large number of facts, by holding that a
layman may draw simple instruments for others without being engaged in the prac-
tice of law.9 The most quoted statement for this position is in In re Eastern Idaho
Loan & Trust Co. where the Idaho court said, "Defendants contend that their spe-
cially advertized activities do and did not constitute practicing law; that they but do
and did what hordes of reputable insurance men, realtors, and bankers have been
doing for years, and what chapter i92, sec. 2 of the Session Laws of 1929 authorized
585; In re Matthews, 62 P. (2d) 578 (Idaho 1936); People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. goi (1931); State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294,
268 N. W. 95 (1936); People v. Alfani, supra note i; Cain v. Underwood (Dist. Ct., N. D. 1935),
BRAND, op. cit. supra at 416; Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N. E.
65o (934); State Bar v. Farmers and Merchants Bank (Dist. Ct., Okla. 1936), BRAND, op. cit. supra at
545; Johnson v. Litster (Dist. Ct., Utah 1936), id. at 575; Paul v. Stanley, i68 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d)
401 (1932); 22 Op. A-r. GEN. Wis. (1933) 827.
'See, e. g., ALA. CODE (5928) §6248; i LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §443; 2 Miss. CODE (1930)
§3710; 2 Mo. REv. STAT. (X929) §11692; TEx. STAT. (2d Supp. 1934) art. 43oa, §2.
a 289 Mass. 607, 613, 194 N. E. 313, 317 (1935).
'Id. at 6X4, 194 N. E. at 317.
'Supra note I at 339, 340, 125 N. E. at 673.
'People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (i919), discussed in the text,
inra, p. 74; see Harman v. Berry, 2 Sup. Ct., D. C. (N. S.) 5 (935); In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust
Co., 49 Idaho 28o, 285, 286, 288 Pac. 157, 159 (1930); People ex tel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock
Yards State Bank, supra note 4 at 477, 478, 176 N. E. at 9o8; Crawford v. McConnell, 173 Okla. 520,
523, 49 P. (2d) 551, 555, 556 (1935); cf. Cain v. Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 66 N. D. 746, 754,
268 N. W. 719, 723 (1936).
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them to do. Such work as the mere clerical filling out of skeleton blanks or drawing
instruments of generally recognized and stereotyped form effectuating the con-
veyance or incumbrance of property, such as a simple deed or mortgage not involving
the determination of the legal effect of special facts and conditions, is generally re-
garded as the legitimate right of any layman."'10 In referring to this statement, the
same court in In re Matthews, a decision holding that the drawing of simple deeds
and real estate mortgages was the practice of law, said, to distinguish the two cases,
"As a matter of fact, a careful reading of the said matter which immediately precedes
the quotation relied upon by defendant Matthews at once discloses a mere mistake in
punctuation, in this, that a period was used instead of a comma" between the two
sentences quoted above. 1 It is submitted that this repunctuation of the earlier case
does not change in the least the substance of its meaning, and hence the later decision
in effect has overruled the earlier.
Other courts hold no distinction can be made-that the filling in of blank forms
or the drawing of simple instruments is just as much the practice of law as the
drawing of a very complex document. 12 Although in People v. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co.,'3 the opinion of the court, prepared by Hiscock, C. J., rested the reversal
of a conviction, for the unlawful practice of law on the basis of this distinction, the
distinction was repudiated by four of the seven judges and not relied upon by a fifth.
In concurring in the result on other grounds, Pound, J., said, "I am unable to rest
any satisfactory test on the distinction between simple and complex instruments. The
most complex are simple to the skilled, and the simplest often trouble the inex-
perienced."'1 4 In a dissenting memorandum prepared by Cardozo, J., for himself and
two other judges, Judge Pound's view was expressly adopted.
Even in the preparation of a simple instrument of blank form, some courts feel a
layman does not know definitely that such an instrument is suited to the particular
circumstances, for he does not know ordinarily the exact legal effect of the stereotyped
words and clauses in the instrument. Therefore the filling in of a printed form has
been held to constitute a determination of the legal effect of special facts and condi-
tions.l 5 In In re Gore, an Ohio Common Pleas court made this statement: "While
some confusion seemingly has arisen with reference to the mere 'filling in of blanks'
as it is expressed, there can be no doubt that the selection of the form to be used and
that the determination by the broker of the suitability and adaptability of the form
to the circumstances of the transaction involves the exercise of legal skill and learn-
ing."' 6
The American Bar Association Committee on Unauthorized Practice has said that
"Supra note 9 at 285, 286, 288 Pac. at 159. 'Iln re Matthews, supra note 4 at 581.
" Clark v. Reardon, 104 S. W. (2d) 407 (Mo. App. 1937); Cain v. Underwood, supra note 4; In re
Gore (Common Pleas Ct., Ohio 1936), BRAND, op. cit. supra note 4 at 472, a#'d, Ohio Ct. of App. 2d.
dist., Dec. 30, 1937 (1938) io Osno BAR 511; State Bar v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, aipra note 4;
Paul v. Stanley, supra note 4.
'1Supnz note 9. "Supra note 9 at 379, 125 N. E. at 670.
"In re Ratlike (Circ. Ct., Mich. 1936), BRAND, Op. cit. supra note 4 at 614, In re Gore, supra note 12.
"In re Gore, supra note 12.
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it is not against public interest for one not licensed to fill in the blanks of legal
instruments appropriately, if they have been selected by one licensed to practice law,
and are used for the particular purpose only within a'reasonable time after such
advice and selection.'
(3) The real estate brokers' contention that they may draft instruments for the
parties to transactions which they have negotiated rests on the principle that anyone
who is a party or principal in a transaction may draw the instruments or do any other
'legal work in relation thereto.'" As stated in Judd v. The City Trust & Savings
Bank, "Since practicing law involves the performance of services for others, any
individual is accorded the right to do his own legal work either in court or out."' 9
The courts are divided whether this principle may be extended to protect the broker
who, though neither party nor principal, yet has a substantial interest in the trans-
action.
In the Pennsylvania case of Childs v. Smeltzer, it was said that if the drawing of
an instrument, such as a deed or lease, is a concomitant of an unlicensed person's
business, or grows out of a business transaction in which he is interested, he may
prepare such a paper for the parties.20 The court in this case said, "A real estate
broker is not prohibited from drawing a deed or conveyance or other appropriate
instrument relating to property of which he or his associates have negotiated a sale
or lease." 2' 1 Under this view it seems immaterial whether the instrument is a blank
form, simple, or complex, although one case stated that an unlicensed person may
draw simple deeds and mortgages if they are incidental to transactions in which he
is interested, provided no charge is made.22 The Childs case is in conflict with the
decisions of three courts,2 3 two of which state that it is not sound to allow a real
estate broker to draw such instruments because he has a conflicting interest arising
from the fact that his compensation depends upon the successful closing of the trans-
action.2 4 No court seems to have adverted to a further reason advanced by the
American Bar Association Committee on Unauthorized Practice, which said,
"Almost every phase of the law would be deemed to be, by the various trades, pro-
" 61 Am. BAR ASS'N REP. (1936) 71'.
'"Copeland v. Dabbs, 221 Ala. 489, i29 So. 88 (1930); State Bar v. Farmers and Merchants Bank,
supra note 4.
20133 Ohio St. 8x, 91 (937). If an unlicensed person acts as an amanuensis in drawing an instru-
ment as dictated to him by a principal to the transaction, such as a vendor or purchaser, he is held not to
be practicing law. State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, supra note 4; Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v.
Dworken, supra note 4. For example, if an unlicensed person were to draw an instrument for himself
by dictating it to a stenographer, or were to tell the stenographer to obtain a certain blank form and insert
data therein which he has given her, the stenographer would, not be engaged in the practice of law, for
the selection of the instrument and the determination of the material to be put in is the act of the employ-
ing party, the stenographer merely performing the mechanical act of recording.
W 315 Pa. 9, 171 Ad. 883 (934); see also Pound, J., in People v. Ttle Guarantee & Trust Co., supra
note 9 at 380, 125 N. E. at 670.
Childs v. Smeltzer, supra note ao at 14, 15, I7 At. at 886.
: Cain v. Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co., supra note 9 at 754, 268 N. W. at 723.
'In re Brainard, 55 Idaho 153, 39 P. (2d) 769 (1934); In re Abbey (Circ. Ct., Mich. 1934), BRAND,
op. cit. supra note 4 at 244; In re Gore, supra note 12.
" In re Abbey, supra note 23; In re Gore, supra note 12.
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fessions, businesses, and 'services,' purely ancillary and incidental to some one or
more of them."25
(4) The importance of the fourth contention, relating to the presence or absence
of compensation, rests on the fact that real estate brokers who draw papers for their
clients generally make no charge therefor where they are effectuating a deal for the
parties. Some statutes which attempt a definition of the practice of law state that the
drawing of instruments is the practice of law where done for a consideration, 20 re-
ward,27 or pecuniary benefit, present or anticipated.281 In England, a layman was not
fined for transacting business pertaining to the office of a public notary unless he did
so for or in expectation of any gain, fee, or reward.2 9 Most courts have taken the
view that a consideration or compensation is needed before the preparing of legal
papers can be said to be the practice of law.30 If there is compensation in money,
the drawing of instruments is yet the practice of law even though the compensation
may not be paid by the client.31 The amount of the consideration is also immaterial.
32
Since, even where the preparation is done without a charge, the parties to a trans-
action are, of course, still liable to be injured if the layman preparing the papers is
ignorant or inexperienced, the American Bar Association Committee on Unauthor-
ized Practice has argued that "the presence, or absence, of consideration is not a
proper distinguishing element by which to determine the existence of unlawful
practice. Whether or not it is present in no way limits the injury to the profession,
or, what is more important, to the public."33 Two cases substantiate this position by
holding that even without compensation the drawing of deeds, mortgages and similar
instruments for others by a layman constitutes the unlawful practice of law.34 In
State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, the court said, "Defendant insists that to constitute
the practice of law one must hold himself out as a licensed attorney and receive a fee
for his service. We think that this claim is not well founded .... It might as well
be said that a surgeon who performs, without fee or reward, a tonsillectomy or
appendectomy is not practicing surgery."35
The defense that no compensation is received for drafting papers must be inter-
preted to mean that no payment is received specifically for this service. The drawing
of instruments is one among several services which a real estate broker performs, and
for which he is compensated in a lump sum in the form of his commission. Thus,
' 6o Amd. BAR Ass'N REP. (1935) 534.
Mo. REv. STAT., supra note 5; see State ex int. Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74
S. W. (ad) 348 (1934) holding that the nomination of a trust company as executor or trustee was a
"valuable consideration" for the drafting of wills and trust agreements.
' Miss. CODE, SU fa note 5.
' AL. CODE, supra note 5; LA. GEN. STAT., supra note 5; TEx. STAT., supra note 5.
'6 & 7 Vic-r., c. 90 (x843).
:"Yeats v. Cunningham, supra note 4; Childs v. Smeltzer, supra note 2o; Paul v. Stanley, stpra note
4; see Clark v. Reardon, supra note x2 at 409.
t Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash. x67, 19 P. (2d) 942 (x933).
'See In re Matthews, supra note 4 at 580. a 6o Ame. BAIt ASS'N REP. (1935) 533.
'State ex tel. Wright v. Barlow, supra note 4; State Bar v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, supra
note 4. 23Supra note 4 at 296, 297, 268 N. W. at 96.
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there is a consideration or compensation for this service in a broad sense. Of course,
his commission is not paid solely for his having drafted the instruments to the trans-
action for the parties, but it is also assertable that neither is his bringing together of
the vendor and purchaser or lessor and lessee the entire object for which his com-
mission is paid. Whether or not a real estate broker draws papers for a direct charge,
his purpose is to bring the transaction to a close and thereby make a profit in the
form of a commission. Hence it would be difficult to find an instance where no
compensation existed. 36
(5) That the drafting of legal instruments for others has not always been the
exclusive province of the lawyer is shown by the fact that public notaries in England
have had the privilege of writing conveyances of realty and of drawing legal instru-
ments for others.37 Still, this privilege could not be engaged in by the ordinary
layman, but was limited to these notaries in order to protect the public against in-
experienced persons. 38 In order to ensure trained persons for this wcrk, no one could
be admitted as a public notary in England until he had actually served seven years as
an apprentice,30 and an applicant was subject to be required to show character qualifi-
cations.40 Any person doing anything for gain pertaining to the office of a public
notary was subject to a fine of C50,41 and if a public notary allowed his name to be
used for the profit of another person not entitled to act as a public notary, he should
be forever disabled from practicing as a public notary.42
Against the contention that, since the judiciary has the inherent power to define
and regulate the practice of law, any legislative enactment which stultifies this power
is unconstitutional,4 3 the existence of this privilege on the part of notaries in England
might afford a basis for sustaining a statute according like powers to notaries (and
even real estate brokers) in this country, at least if they were required to meet
comparable standards. However, it is scarcely precedent for an extension of the
privilege to persons not specially authorized to perform such acts. Two statutes do
" In a copyright infringement action wherein a restaurant orchestra had performed a copyrighted
musical composition without charge for admission, it was held to have performed the work publicly "for
profit." In speaking for the court mr. Justice Holmes said, "The defendants' performances are not eleemos-
ynary. They are part of a total for which the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is
attributed to a particular item [food] which those present are expected to order, is not important. It is
true that the music is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which probably could be got cheaper
elsewhere. . . . If music did not pay, it would be given up. If it pays it pays out of the public's pocket.
Whether it pays or not the purpose of employing it is profit and that is enough." Herbert v. The Shanley
Co., 242 U. S. 591, 594, 595 (917).
07 2 4 H~sBuay's LAws OF ENO. (2d ed. 1937) §1; Hutcheon v. Mannington, 6 Ves. 823, 824 (Ch.
1802). Notaires in France are also allowed to draft instruments. FRENCH CIVIL CODE (Wright's trans.
1908) arts. 971, 972, 1317, and 2127. Notaries in this country are unlike the continental notaries. As
said by Crane, J., "Only in the name is there a correspondence to the continental official." People v.
Alfani, supra note I at 340, 341, 125 N. E. at 674.
W2 HAsmIsuy's LAws o ENG. (2d ed. 1931) §68z; Taylor v. The Crowland Gas & Coke Co., 1o
Ech. 293 (Ex. 1854).
"41 GEo. III, C. 79 (i8os). The King v. Scriveners' Co., io B. & C. 511 (K. B. 1830).
'06 & 7 VicT., c. 9o (1843).
'ibid. 4 GEo. III, c. 79 (18o).
"Muenier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. App. 1936); Opinion of the Justices, supra note 6.
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allow a real estate broker to draft instruments for the parties to a transaction he has
negotiated,44 and a statute of Delaware allows any person on payment of a license
fee to draw conveyances and any other papers, no qualifications apparently being
required.45
In a number of states, real estate brokers are required to be licensed, although
the statutes are silent as to whether the privilege to draft instruments is conferred
by the license. As a prerequisite to obtaining a license, in a few of these states,
the statute requires the applicant to pass an examination, showing among other
things that he has a fair knowledge of the principles of real estate conveyancing
pertaining to deeds, mortgages, land contracts, leases, etc. A New York statute is as
follows: "In determining the competency, the department shall require proof that
the applicant for a broker's license has a fair knowledge of the English language, a
fair understanding of the general purposes and general legal effect of deeds, mort-
gages, land contracts of sale, and leases, a general and fair understanding of the
obligations between principal and agent, as well as of the provisions of this act, and
that he has been engaged in the real estate brokerage business for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the date of filing his application for a
license under this article." 40 A Michigan statute, after providing for an examination
of the applicant's character, adds the provision: "The Commission shall also require
each applicant for broker's license to pass an examination establishing, in a manner
satisfactory to the commission, that the applicant has . . . a fair understanding of the
laws and principles of real estate conveyancing, deeds, mortgages, land contracts,
leases, the obligations of a broker to the public and his principal, . . .,,47 Since
licensed real estate brokers in these states have some training and experience, they
cannot be said to fall precisely in the category of an untrained layman.48
In the only case to interpret a licensing statute of this character, Detroit Bar Asso-
ciation v. Ward, a Michigan circuit court was apparently of the opinion that a "fair
understanding" of conveyancing was insufficient to qualify a real estate broker to
draw leases, contracts, and deeds for others. In that case the court said, "We all
realize that in the writing of examinations on certain subjects that a certain general
knowledge of many subjects is required but I do not feel in this instance it would go
so far as to admit of a real estate broker being entitled to give out information with
regard to law and the drafting of legal instruments because the rules of the Securities
Commission pertaining to the examination of real estate brokers demanded certain
questions with respeci to law and legal papers be included in the examination."40
Although there have been a few statements and intimations that an isolated act or
a single transaction, such as the drawing of one instrument for another without
" iM MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. io, §i (as to several counties); R. I. Acts & Resolves, Sp. Sess.,
'935, c. 2190, §46, cl. B, par. 7. "DEL. REv. CODE (935) §§193, 194.
"N. Y. CONSOL. LAws (Cahill, 1930) C. 51, §441. '72 MIct. Comp. LAWS (1930) §9813.
"There is some similarity between the qualifications required in the above and similar statutes con-
cerning the English notary.
" (Circ. Ct., Mich. 1934), Ba.&D, op. cit. supra note 4 at 249, 252, 253.
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making a practice of doing such, will not constitute the practice of law,"0 and two
New York cases have so held,51 two other courts have held that such isolated acts
are nevertheless the practice of law.52  But if the acts of unlawful practice are infre-
quent and few, no injunction will be granted against the future occurrence of similar
acts where they are unlikely to happen.53 The American Bar Association Committee
on Unauthorized Practice has said that "there seems to be no good reason why the
acts of one who has no right to do what he is attempting to do should be altogether
free from challenge until and unless his conduct has the continuity of, or has reached
such volume that it is a 'practice,' 'business,' or a 'profession'." 54 However, the Com-
mittee also added that "it has no slightest desire that steps to eliminate unlicensed
acts be based on technicalities, or on occasional sporadic, isolated, acts. ' 55
Real estate problems have given rise to a number of points of controversy between
the bar and lay agencies other than those relating to the drafting of legal documents.
For example, the handling and prosecuting of eviction proceedings 8 and foreclosure
proceedings57 by an unlicensed person or a corporation for its landlord clients is
considered to be the unlawful practice of law. The activities of abstract and title
companies have been especially prolific of litigation in this field, but these cases lie
outside the scope of this note.58
' Crane, J., in People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., supra note 9 at 6x5, 125 N. E. at 671; Childs
v. Smeltzer, supra note 2o at x4, 171 Ad. at 885; 22 Op. Arr. GEN. WVsS. (i933) 828. In Opinion of the
Justices, supra note 6 at 615, 194 N. E. at 317, the court said, "The occasional drafting of simple deeds,
and other legal instruments when not conducted as an occupation or yielding substantial income may fall
outside the practice of the law."
'People v. Goldsmith, 249 N. Y. 586, 164 N. E. 593 (1928), reversing 224 App. Div. 707, 229
N. Y. S. 896 (1928); People v. Weil, 237 App. Div. 118, 26o N. Y. Supp. 658 (932).
'r Wayne v. Murphey-Favre & Co., 56 Idaho 788, 59 P. (2d) 721 (936); In re Rathke, supra note z5.
r' Cain v. Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co., supra note 9.
' 6o Am. BAt Ass'N Rap. (1935) 535. "Id. at 536.
r Heiskell v. Mozie, 65 App. D. C. 255, 82 F. (2d) 861 (1936); Harman v. Berry, supra note 9;
Yeats v. Law (Circ. Ct. Fla. 1934), BaM, op. cit. supra note 4 at 324; Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Nat.
Landlords Ass'n (Super. Ct., Ill. 1936), id. at 583; Unger v. Landlords' Management Corp., x14 N. J. Eq.
68, x68 Ad. 229 (1933); Bennett v. Tenants Research Bureau (Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1936), BRAND, Op. Cit.
supra at 562 (consent decree); Dworken v. Department [Apartment] House Owner's Ass'n, 28 Ohio N. P.
Rep. X5 (930). A contrary decision is Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Haldane, 182 Ga. 833, 187 S. E. 68
(1936), but this decision has been nullified by a later statute in Georgia which provides that no party
shall prepare or file affidavits based upon dispossessory warrants, distress warrants, or attachments, or
prosecute the proceedings through any agent or employee who is not a duly licensed attorney-at-law.
Ga. Laws 1937, p. 753.
'
TIn re Otterness, I81 Minn. 254, 232 N. AV. 318 (1930).
' The cases are collected in BAND, op. cit. supra note 4 at 764.
